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Abstract: What is happening if the custom is founded on the coincidence of interests, or even worse, 
on error? If we rapport specific problems of international customary law to the principles of judicial 
interpretation it results that a common error (including opinio juris) does not disturb the process of 
legality proper to the principle error communis facit jus. According to the principle of equity, a 
common error operates only if the victim’s interests are not affected in an irreparable manner. In this 
case, the error is insuperable and represents a vice for judicial nullity. Error cannot be accepted when 
it results from the actions of the state, realized with bad intention, as coercion is. Pacta sunt servanda 
as a jus cogens norm protects nor only good faith. Thus, through interpretation theories in the Anglo-
American environment we will use the refinement of a traditional position in continental 
interpretation, arguing a general method of interpretation based on the recovery of the legislator’s 
intentions, had at the moment of an edition of a juridical norm. We will use of this application the 
dialectics between meanings expressed by the text and those the interpret advances with the role of 
interpretative hypothesis in order to find its meaning.  
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1. Introduction 
The task of interpretation is represented by the dissolving of the misunderstanding 
regarding the meaning of judicial norm. “The genesis of error interpretation is 
double: either through a conscious misunderstanding, either directly. In the first 
case we speak about the author’s fault, most likely about his deviation from the 
current use of language or the use without an analogy, probably it is always about 
a fault of interpretation. We can express the entire task [of hermeneutics] and in a 
negative manner: in any point, the misunderstanding must be suppressed. Because 
no one can accept a simple misunderstanding [conscious]. If this task is completely 
realized, a complete understanding must be produce”. (Schleiermacher, 2001, p. 
41) 
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The problem with this type of interpretation results from the fact that the two types 
of interpretation (the grammatical one, aiming the reconstruction of text meanings 
starting from the context in which this is written) and respectively psychological 
(which supposes the intuition of the author’s intentions regarding the judicial norm 
in favour of which this infinite reconstruction is not helped but by the same 
capacity to consult the historical context, with data gathered in the language) are in 
a circular manner dependent on each other, thus their dialectics remains a 
methodological desire based on the conception on the language as a historical 
environment of life.  
It is true that the doctrine has considerably put problems regarding the jus cogens 
norms as they are defined and how they can be determined. We consider that jus 
cogens represents the ordre publique on the international arena, but only if the rules 
of international moral rules are included as being cogens, and in consequence jus 
cogens could be thus applied to political interests in international relations. 
(Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1953, p. 155) 
 
2. Particularities of Interpretation Theories from the Anglo-American 
Area 
The purposes of valid interpretation are not entirely oriented towards the 
recognition of the author’s intentions, and the validity criteria, considered 
acceptability criteria are prescriptions regarding our manner of understanding the 
judicial norms rapports.  
A language semantic autonomy that is inherited by actual radical relativism is not 
possible only as a reaction to the same common conception over the language used. 
The challenge in this case is not to establish the initial position, but to completely 
give up this conception over language in favour of a more detached and permissive 
one, that is, as pragmatists propose, a conception over language as a tool and the 
using of these tools in a more or less comfortable manner with contextual and 
community relevant interests.  
Internationalist theories in interpretation can be looked at from the point of view of 
a general theory of interpretation that sustains at least the fact that the legislator’s 
intentions are necessarily relevant for the interpretation of norms that he creates. 
Certainly, such a theory of interpretation supposes that these intentions represent in 
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a great measure the criterion of validity of an interpretation that needs to be based 
on data offered during the process of its verification.  
By distinguishing between understanding and interpretation, the differentiating 
between the two types of internationalism can be solved because meaning is not 
built but at a superior level, in the interpretation (in meta-language). The author’s 
intention is real and discovered, but for this it is necessary to build an explanation 
that can build meaning. But this leads us to a double dependence of the intention 
meaning, under the shape of stratified constructions of the interpretation levels. 
Thus, there are more levels of the meaning that correspond to more levels of 
interpretation:  
a) at the first level we find verbal and linguistic sequences, through the 
grammatical method;  
b) at the second level we find the legislator’s intentions; 
c) at the third level we find effective intentions of the judicial norms;  
d) the fourth level sustains a semantic constraint through which the interpreter 
of the judicial norms is capable of recognizing the legislator’s intentions 
and to follow a certain effect that would transmit in an implicit manner the 
idea aimed at by the norm author. (Eco, 1992, pp. 27-35) 
The concept of customary international law is defined by the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)1, in article 38, as being the large and uniform 
practice of states under the imperative opinio iuris sive necesitatis. The literal 
meaning of the Statute is “a practice generally accepted by the law”, but more 
authors have developed article 38 from a dialectic perspective. (Custom, 1999) 
(D'Amato, 1971) (Kontou, 1994) (Rosenne, 1984) (Wallace & Holiday, 2006) 
(Wolfke, 1993) According to this, a practice generally accepted as law is the proof 
of a custom, but the vice-versa situation is irrelevant2. Judge Manley O. Hudson as 
                                               
1
 The Statute of the International Court of Justice found on http://www.icj 
cij.org/documents/index.php? 
2
 Restatement of the Law has presented as evidence of customary international law: 
1. The fact that a rule has become international law is determined by a prove close to the particular 
source from which this derives; 2. In determining if a rule has become international law, a low weight 
is offered to the following: judgments and opinions of international and arbitrary courts; judgments 
and opinions of national judicial courts; to the doctrine; to declarations of states that have understood 
to statute a rule of international law when such declarations have no seriously been doubted by other 
states; (American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law, Third, the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States. American Law Institute Publishers, 1987). 
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developed for the International Law Commission the demands of art. 38 into five 
preconditions (Hudson, 1950): 
1. Concordant practices of states referring to a type of situation in international 
relations;  
2. Repetition and the continuing of this practice for a period of time; 
3. The conformity of that practice with superior norms of international law; 
4. A general recognition of this practice by the other states (facultative); 
5. The legality of the elements mentioned offered by a legal authority. 
On one side, this definition qualifies the normative character of the custom, and in 
the same time differentiates customary international law from other forms of 
international law. On the other side, the definition explains how the states can 
repudiate by their behaviours the rules of customary international law in spite of the 
fact that the deviations from the norm does not necessarily mean the repudiation of 
that rule.  
For the same case, OCJ has declared in the North See Continental Shelf case that 
the customary international law is a long and undisputed practice of the states. The 
frequency and the habitual character are not sufficient for the defining of customary 
international law, because „comity” also supposes frequent and repeated acts of 
courtesy (the same situation being valuable for international moral). In the same 
manner, ICJ has declared in the Lotus case that the abstinence of exercising penal 
jurisdiction on acts committed on board of boats in international sea represents an 
international custom “if such abstinence is based on the existence of their 
consciousness that they have the duty to abstain”.  
The Rational Choice theory has underlined the fact that nobody showed what types 
of national actions matter in international state practice. We consider that it is 
generally accepted the fact that the evolution of international law regarding the 
delimitation between the domains reserved to states and that of international law 
will establish which sectors can be considered international states practices in the 
development process of customary international law.  
In any case, I do not agree with the arguments of the two theoreticians that the 
jurists’ writings represent tendentious sources of the customary international law 
and treaties represent informal sources of customs. Treaties may constitute a source 
of customary international law for the states that are not parties to the treaties. The 
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jurists’ writings cannot create customary international law understood as a repeated 
practice of states, but they may explain or influence it.  
Non-compulsory declarations and resolutions emitted by the international 
multilateral organisms are seen as proves of customary international law, because 
they explain international behaviours1. It is true that customary international law 
theories do not show us how vast and uniform international practices of all states 
must be. The International Court of Justice has established in The Right of Passage 
on The Indian Territory (Portugal versus India) case that practices between states 
can be general or bilateral2. 
 
3. Contradictory Debates 
The customary international law regarding opinio juris sive necesitatis has given 
birth to contradictory debates. For this matter, four hypotheses have been emitted:  
1. The compulsory character of customs is perceived as a pre-existent obligation. 
This theory was criticized because it limits the future development of customary 
international law;  
2. The “error” argument explains opinio juris as being a common belief of states 
that follow a new legal norm where there wasn’t any; 
3. Practicism according to which opinio juris is obvious when the practice of states 
is clear and consistent; 
4. Finally, a part of the doctrine considers that opinio juris is not compulsory. 
According to this theory, he process of creating a new custom can be explained in a 
variety of methods, from the necessity of a general recognition of the new custom 
by the sates to the hypothesis that the accuracy of their belief is irrelevant or to the 
                                               
1
 In Principles of Public International Law, Ian Brownlie lists the following sources as proves of the 
custom: „The material sources of the custom are numerous and include the following: diplomatic 
correspondence, political declarations, press declarations, opinions of official legal counselors, 
official notebooks on legal matters, military law notebooks, executive decisions and practices, orders 
to naval forces, comments offered by governments over the projects of the International Law 
Commission, states legislations, national and international judicial decisions, declarations from 
treaties or other international instruments, a pattern of the treaties from the same category, practice 
of international organs and the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly regarding legal 
matters”. (Brownlie, 2003. p. 6). 
2
 Case Concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Merits) [1960] ICJ 
Reports 6 p. 39. 
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possibility la that the states can be deceived by others, when the latter have affirmed 
a false conception, on purpose.  
The last point debated by the theory has raised a sensible problem regarding the 
consent of states in the creation of international customs. Referring to this problem, 
Michel Byers has sustained that the necessity of the states accept represents an 
inadequate explanation of customary rules and that the states may be kept only by 
their suzerain will. Morris Mendelson has also considered that any presumption 
favouring the condition of the states consent is inadequate. (Mendelson, 1995, p. 
185–194) 
In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. 
U.S.) case ICJ has established that there are other rules of international law than the 
ones accepted by the states. In spite the fact that the role of the non-state actors is 
developing in the creation process of international norms, states have remained 
central subjects of this process, with their privileges in determining the fact that 
there is a new law.  
The committee of the International Law Association regarding the realization of 
customary (general) international law has accessed in the Final Rapport1 the states 
superiority in the determination of customary rules, but has rejected the conditions 
regarding states consent as a general precondition of customary international law. It 
has been sustained the fact that in this case consent is compulsory for the rule 
corresponding to customary international law according to the pacta sunt servanda 
principle, understood in the following manner “consent obliges the state that has 
given the consent” (he principle of protecting good faith). The states consent is not 
a compulsory precondition, because the common belief that that practice is legally 
compulsory is sufficient to create an international customary law. Belief represents 
a sufficient precondition, but not a necessary one, because opinio juris can be 
proven by any means and methods. 
The affirmations of the Committee of the International Law Association allow the 
conclusion that, on one side, a particular action can give birth to a customary rule, 
despite the fact that the states do not accept it as a legal obligation. On the other 
side, a particular action, capable of creating customary international law may be 
undercut by contrary opinions of the states. 
                                               
1
 The Final Report of The Committee, London Conference (2000) presented on www. ila-hq.org. 
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From the intersections of both theories (the facultative character of the states 
consent and the opinio juris belief) it would results that opinio juris compensates a 
relative absence of the practice and vice-versa. But what happens, in the case of a 
putative customary international rule, when that state is kept by a practice based on 
conceptions or false information regarding the existence of particular legal 
obligations? The theory “more practice, less need for a subjective element” 
regarding customary law does not show us how strong and how long must the 
practice of the states be in order to opinio juris. Less practice can be underlined by a 
strong opinio juris in order to give birth to a customary international rule? 
I consider that the realization process of the customary international law without the 
states consent is not legal in the virtue of the fact that international law is based on 
horizontal relations and the apparition of a hierarchy is visible only in the interior of 
international organizations.  
Thus, a part of the theoreticians have tried to approve a new idea – the role of the 
states interests in the creation process of customary international law.  
The Paquette Habana case has been proposed as basis for debates regarding the use 
of the “coercion” concept in order to explain the manner in which a more powerful 
owner of fishing sips intimidates a weaker adversary (during a war). The latter fears 
to capture the boat due to the owner’s reprisals.  
Another concept of this theory is based on the phrase “coincidence of interests”. 
According to this, fishing boats that belong to a belligerent have not been captured 
because their enemy considered that the costs imposes are more substantial than the 
benefits won. “Cooperation” is the third explanation for the abstention to capture a 
fishing boat that belongs to a belligerent, by its enemy. Each state is encouraged to 
attack as long as the others abstain to proceed in the same manner. Equilibrium will 
be kept only if a quiet belief of the part exists, if one of the captures the fishing 
boars of the other, the latter will proceed in the same manner1. Another argument is 
”coordination” according to which states have accepted to develop a common rule, 
which will be more advantageous for both states that follow a convergent road, than 
a separate one.  
The arguments used cannot exclude the compulsory character of customary 
international law, because law itself, from a conceptual point of view, is defined as 
                                               
1
 This situation was named by the authors and used in the doctrine as “Bilateral repeat prisoners’ 
dilemma”. 
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an expression of existent interests at a given time. When general interests cannot be 
satisfied by law, than the law is changed without having any effect on its 
compulsory feature.  
H.L.A Hart makes a distinction between legal social and moral norms due to a 
proper interest in both categories of norms. (Hart et al. 1997, pp. 225–226) The 
interests engaged by international law are, usually, common interests of the 
international community (regional or multilateral, even bilateral). Phillip Trimble 
considers that a state may decide to forget advantages on a short period, derived 
from the violation of international law norms, because it has a supreme interest in 
the maintaining of the entire system. General international law is seen as affecting 
directly the interests of states. (Trimble, 1990, pp. 811- 833) 
Byers noted that states are not only subjects bur also creators of international law. 
This means international law results from common or coordinated behaviours (at 
least on one side) and for this reason, international law reflects interests on a long 
term of most, if not all the states. In conclusion, the states behaviours oblige them to 
take part in international relations. States are aware that their behaviours may create 
customs that can become obligations. States also desire to form rules by their 
actions. The facts mentioned distinguish the legality process of customary 
international law from the process of assuming decisions by which authorities act to 
satisfy their interests. Interesting debates have been raise by the vice of the states 
consent by coercion. The problem will be solved after the theories mentioned, 
regarding the state consent, have been chosen.  
Despite the fact that customary international law is seen as an unwritten practice of 
states, t is clearly influenced by conventional law (treaties, the resolutions of United 
Nations organisms etc.) of international jurisprudence and the general principles of 
law1. 
The legality of customary international law is also given by its conformity to 
universal conventions, usually insuring an international suzerain equality and, in 
consequence, rejecting coercion at a world level. When the custom is contrary to 
these, is legal compulsory character is undercut by the general treaty because the 
opinio juris of states cannot be presumed.  
                                               
1
 These are sources of customary international law according to art. 38 of the International Court of 
Justice Statute.  
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The Vienna Treaties Convention does not contain any provision regarding an 
eventual conflict contradictio in terminis between customary law and the 
conventional one. Thus raises the hypothesis in which the parties have concluded a 
treaty contrary to the old custom, if a normative conflict regarding this situation 
appears.  
The treaty provisions will prevail over the custom because an express and written 
agreement of the states is less doubtful than an unwritten custom. The explanation 
regarding the treaty superiority refers to the fact that the treaty more recently shows 
actual interests of the state and the old custom ceases to show novelty, according to 
the lex posterior derogate legi priori principle. Another point of view would be the 
fact that the treaty represents lex specialis on its argument jus scriptum being 
superior to the older custom according to especially general bus derogate.  
Mark E. Villiger (Villiger, 1985, p. 37) considers that the two principles must be 
used together and do not complete one another. Lex posterior raises the problem of 
establishing a precise moment (which is very difficult) for the realization of a 
customary rule and lex specialis represents a danger for preexistent universal 
conventions regarding human rights. The same author refers to the fact that 
customary international law and treaties represent autonomous sources of law and 
for this reason, they are equivalent to a compulsory force. In consequence, they can 
influence each other and the principle mutuus consensus mutuus dissenssus (a rule 
can be alternated only by another of the same gender) cannot be applied. For this 
matter, a customary norm can be changed by a simple treaty. The latter can be 
modified again by a future customary norm. (Villiger, 1985, p. 35) We cannot apply 
the same reasoning when unwritten norms of jus cogens are implicated, due to 
article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which stipulate the nullity of the treaties that 
overrides jus cogens, even if the treaty is more recent. Gerald Fitzmaurice declared 
that it is generally recognized in the application of a declarative treaty the fact that 
the parties conform to the obligations of general law, already valid for them. 
(Fitzmaurice, 1958, pp. 170-173) 
If the future treaty a cause to end the preexistent customary international rules? The 
International Court of Justice has declared in the North See Continental Shelf1 case 
that the rules of law with a fundamental character, regarding the continental shelf 
are contained in the Continental Shelf Convention, even independently. An 
                                               
1
 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Published A. W. Sijthoff 
Germany (West), Denmark (1969). 
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international convention, being an independent source of law cannot touch 
customary law, (Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, 
1998, pp. 220-221) but it can modify it or transform it from a general customary 
rule to a local one. 
A second hypothesis refers to the situation in which the parties of the existent treaty 
agree to change some of the provisions forming new customs. For this matter, the 
principle bona fide supposes the situation in which the states consent obliges them 
in the international arena.  
Also, the Project of the International Court Commission (ICC) on the modification 
of treaties through practices subsequent in art. 38 is (that does not regard the rules 
of jus cogens): „a treaty can be modified by a subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty having the agreement of the parties to modify its 
provisions…” In travaux préparatoires ICC has considered an agreement of the 
states that seemed to be not only an act by the Vienna Treaties Convention by art. 
421 had confirmed the possibility of the treaty provisions, which do not result from 
customs, in order to become customs.  
Michael Akehurst has expressed his opinion that it is “difficult to interpret the 
erasing of article 38 as a clear rejection of the fact that the existent law allowed a 
treaty to be amended by a subsequent practice, especially if, the Vienna 
Convention has not excluded the possibility of concluding treaties by desuetude 
and allows in an express manner a treaty to be interpreted in the light of 
subsequent practice (art. 31(3) (b)…” (Akehurst, 1977, p. 277) The same tendency 
seem to be constituted by the Arbitrary Decision from 1963 on the interpretation of 
the Bilateral Agreement regarding air transport between France and the United 
States2 as the consultative notice on Namibia3 emitted by ICJ in 1971. But, 
                                               
1
 Art. 42(2) of the Vienna Convention stipulates that the abrogation of a treaty can take place “only as 
a result of the application of the treaty provisions or of the present Convention”. 
2
 This refers to “this course of action can be in fact, taken into consideration, not pure and simple as 
a useful means for the intercepting of the ICC agreement, but also as something more: this is a 
possible source of the subsequent modification resulting from certain actions of attitudes, on the 
judicial situation or rights that they could claim in an adequate manner” (Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, Vol. XVI, pp. 62-63). 
3
 In its consultative notice, ICJ has declared that “the fundamental rules and the position adopted by 
the members of the Council, especially by its permanent members, have interpreted consistently and 
uniformly the practice of voluntary abstention of a permanent member as not representing a barrier 
for the adoption of a resolution…This procedure followed by the Council of Security which has 
continued unchanged after the 1965 amendment of art. 27 of the Charta, was generally accepted by 
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customary rules and treaties are laws with a compulsory normative character 
despite the assertions Goldsmith-Posner (regarding the lack of legality or the 
compulsory character for both sources) because they have consented to this 
according to art. 35 from the ICJ Statute and to change this fact would mean to 
degrade the rules of international law.  
The Goldsmith-Posner theory is wrong under the aspects mentions regarding the 
fact that the major role of states interest in the process of changing customary 
international law would signify the fact that customary law lacks legality. The sense 
of the idea reflecting the role of the states interests in changing customary 
international law is that states must conciliate their interests with the existent law 
and in consequence, the law represents the harmony of different interests of states, 
the reconciliation between them, at least in the first stage (the gaining f the states 
consent). Then, it becomes impersonal and compulsory on all parts. The changing 
of customary laws cannot degenerate to an inferior level of their illegality. They 
will be changed only in a progressive sense according to the evolution of standards 
generally recognized of international law. May customary law be changed 
according to more reduced standards? The answer to this problem will be found by 
approaching a dialectic perspective of the evolution of customary international law 
through the principle of equity. Equity refers to a general protection of the law 
subjects (intern – individual persons and legal person or international – states on 
non-state actors) against any prejudice or their damage. Equity implies the actor’s 
responsibility in the international arena.  
As general principle of law, equity is frequently classified in secundum legem, 
praeter legem and contra legem equity. When equity accompanies the new custom 
(secundum legem), the change of customary international law is legal. If equity is 
capable of remediating the insufficiencies of the new customary law (praeter 
legem), the vices of the new custom are not the cause of its nulit. But when equity 
operates in opposition to law so that it alters it or temperate its effects (contra 
legem), the new practice cannot be legal, thus in consequence it is not a law. 
These are variants of interpretation, being differentiated according the spatial 
criterion, of the translation of the normative meaning towards a more extended of 
restraint area of situations in rapport to that presumed in the normative text. These 
have in common the fact that they regard the norm in a spatial order, that of a 
                                                                                                                        
the members of the United Nations and probes a general practice of the Organization” (ICJ Reports 
1971, p. 22). 
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rapport understood as a connection between exterior reciprocal entities, on one side 
the prescription of the norm, general and abstract, and on the other side, particular 
cases it refer to. (Huma, 2005, p. 119) 
If we rapport the object only to political interest but not to law, all the facts 
mentioned cannot be applied because equity acts only in the interior of the law and 
moral. But, political interest must cease to violate others rights. International 
community cannot allow political interests to dictate practices of unfair and injuring 
states.  
The extension of concepts, the analogy and induction, regarded as “complex 
procedures of judicial technique of law, on one side and the considering of law 
reason, the distinctions and the argument a contrario on the other side, regarded as 
„procedures of restrictive interpretation”, all these tend to be reduced to a formal 
and technical condition of exterior instruments of following the applicability of the 
law in situations quantified exclusively by the coercion power of the law, that is of 
the imperative considered in the exteriority towards the situation seen as an 
axiological neutral state in rapport to the exigencies of the law.  
“The general method of judicial sciences could be named for the understanding by 
paideic interpretation1 (Marcu & Maneca, 1975, p. 775) of positive law, because 
law if mainly participative. In the absence of a definitive character, interpretation is 
never paideic, even if it would lack humanism. The term paideic interpretation 
seems socking until the development of its meaning with direct consequences for an 
evolution dimensioning of the law – cultural and civilization”. (Mihai, 2003, p. 94) 
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